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SEGMENTATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
REVIEW: WHY DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE v. 
U.S. NAVY THREATENS THE EFFECTIVENESS 
OF NEPA AND THE ESA 
ERICA NOVACK* 
Abstract: In Defenders of Wildlife v. United States Department of the Navy, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the environmental re-
view conducted by the Navy and the National Marine and Fishery Service re-
garding the proposed construction and operation of a warfare training range was 
in compliance with federal law. In particular, the court found that segmentation 
of review at its final stages did not violate the National Environmental Policy Act 
or the Endangered Species Act. This Comment addresses the danger of allowing 
a technicality to authorize segmentation of environmental review, and its poten-
tial negative impacts on endangered species, such as the North Atlantic right 
whale. The Eleventh Circuit could have followed the trends of other circuit 
courts, such as the Second and Ninth Circuits, to invalidate the Navy’s and the 
NMFS’s environmental review. 
INTRODUCTION 
The calving ground of the North Atlantic right whale sees the birth of an-
ywhere from one to thirty-nine right whale calves per year.1 The whaling in-
dustry of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries decimated the right whale 
population, and in 1970, the marine mammal was placed on the endangered 
species list pursuant to the law that would eventually become the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA) in 1973.2 Because the right whale population has remained 
critically low, the calves born annually are critical to replenishing the popula-
tion, which ranges from just three to four hundred whales.3 Today, the right 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2014–2015. 
 1 NORTHEAST FISHERIES SERV., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC AGENCY, NORTH ATLANTIC 
RIGHT WHALE (EUBALAENA GLACIALIS) 5-YEAR REVIEW: SUMMARY AND EVALUATION 8 (2012), 
available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/species/narightwhale_5yearreview.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/J87M-GH95. 
 2 North Atlantic Right Whales (Eubalaena Glacialis), NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC AGENCY 
OFFICE OF PROTECTED RES., http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/species/mammals/cetaceans/rightwhale_
northatlantic.htm (last updated Dec. 6, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/9YHV-8MYF. 
 3 See id. 
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whale remains “the world’s most critically endangered large whale species and 
one of the world’s most endangered mammals.”4 
The North Atlantic right whale is a species of baleen whale that migrates 
annually along the Atlantic coast of North America.5 Though their migratory 
patterns are not fully understood, there is only one known area to which preg-
nant females travel to give birth to calves.6 This calving ground—located off 
the coast of the Florida-Georgia border—is within thirty-five miles of the site 
of a proposed $127 million U.S. Navy (the “Navy”) naval warfare training 
ground.7 
Since 1996, the Navy has been developing a plan to establish a training 
range in shallow water to better prepare its fleets for overseas activity.8 In 2008, 
the Navy announced a plan to develop such a range within a site known as the 
Jacksonville Operating Area, which it has used as a fleet concentration area since 
World War II.9 Since that announcement, the Navy has worked to complete all 
statutorily required environmental reviews of the proposed action.10 
Conservation groups are concerned by the placement of the proposed 
training range because of its proximity to the calving ground, which is a criti-
cal habitat of the North Atlantic right whale.11 Once it is constructed, the Navy 
intends to perform approximately 470 training exercises annually in the range, 
involving vessel and aircraft traffic and the use of sonar technology within thir-
ty-five miles of the calving ground.12 Any threat from ship strikes, entangle-
ments, or the use of sonar to even a few individual whales could jeopardize the 
continued existence of the species.13 
In Defenders of Wildlife v. United States Department of the Navy, these 
concerned environmentalists brought a lawsuit against the Navy, the National 
Marine Fisheries Services (“NMFS”), and several other federal organizations, 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Endangered Fish and Wildlife; Final Rule to Implement Speed Restrictions to Reduce the 
Threat of Ship Collisions with North Atlantic Right Whales, 73 Fed. Reg. 60,173 (Oct. 10, 2008). 
 5 NORTHEAST FISHERIES SERV., supra note 1, at 7; North Atlantic Right Whales (Eubalaena 
Glacialis), supra note 2. 
 6 NORTHEAST FISHERIES SERV., supra note 1, at 8, 10 (noting that available right whale sighting 
data suggests four important feeding areas and one calving area—the Georgia-Florida coast—along 
the Atlantic coast). 
 7 Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 733 F.3d 1106, 1108, 1116 (11th Cir. 2013); 
North Atlantic Right Whales (Eubalaena Glacialis), supra note 2, at 1–2. 
 8 Defenders of Wildlife, 733 F.3d at 1109. 
 9 Id. at 1110. 
 10 Id. at 1109. 
 11 See id. at 1108. 
 12 Id. at 1110–11. 
 13 50 C.F.R. pt. 224 (2015). “Recent . . . models indicate that the loss of even a single individual 
may contribute to the extinction of the species; likewise, according to the models, preventing the mor-
tality of one adult female a year alters the projected outcome.” Endangered Fish and Wildlife; Ad-
vance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) for Right Whale Ship Strike Reduction, 69 Fed. Reg. 
30,857, 30,858 (proposed June 1, 2004) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 224). 
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alleging violations of the ESA, the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA), and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).14 The U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of Georgia granted summary judgment in favor 
of the federal agencies and on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit affirmed.15 This Comment argues that, although the Navy com-
plied with the black letter law of NEPA and the ESA, the decision in Defenders 
of Wildlife threatens to weaken the environmental protection value of these 
statutes by authorizing the segmentation of the environmental review pro-
cess.16 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 1996, the Navy issued a notice of its intent to prepare an environmental 
impact statement (“EIS”)—as required by NEPA—regarding its plan to devel-
op a training range along the Atlantic seaboard.17 By 2005, the Navy released a 
draft EIS, listing a potential site off the coast of North Carolina for the range.18 
In 2008, the Navy revised the draft EIS, moving the proposed site to an area 
off the coast of Florida, in a region known as the Jacksonville Operating Area 
(“JOA”), which it has used for military training purposes since World War II.19 
The Navy designated the training range the Undersea Warfare Training Range 
(“USWTR”).20 The USWTR will hold sea vessel and aircraft operations train-
ing and will be able to hold shallow-water training, which the Navy contends 
is essential to overseas operations.21 
The USWTR will be located fifty nautical miles off the coast of the Flori-
da-Georgia border.22 According to the Navy, this is the most efficient location 
for such a range, because the JOA is already in operation and houses a large 
volume of the Navy’s aircraft on the Atlantic coast.23 Construction of the US-
WTR will involve the installation of 300 fiber optic cable nodes within an area 
                                                                                                                           
 14 733 F.3d at 1108–09. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id.; see Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 351 n.3 (1979); Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 
1142–45 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the commitment of resources to a proposed action prior to envi-
ronmental review violates NEPA); Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1457–58 (9th Cir. 1988); see 
also Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917, 930 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding 
“a listed species could be gradually destroyed, so long as each step on the path to destruction is suffi-
ciently modest”). 
 17 Defenders of Wildlife, 733 F.3d at 1109. 
 18 Id. at 1110. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 1108. 
 21 Id. at 1109, 1111. 
 22 Id. at 1108. 
 23 Id. at 1110. 
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of 500 square nautical miles of the Atlantic Ocean.24 A trunk cable will then 
run to a receiver facility in Mayport, Florida.25 
The trunk cable will pass directly through the North Atlantic right whale 
critical habitat, located thirty-five miles from the USWTR.26 The Navy will 
suspend installation during calving season, and will bury the trunk cable below 
the sea floor within the calving area.27 These installations will use acoustic 
signals from operating vessels to produce valuable training information.28 
The Navy’s draft EIS considered four alternative sites to the JOA, includ-
ing waters off the coasts of North Carolina, South Carolina, Maine, and Virgin-
ia.29 It heard public comments and issued a final EIS.30 Further, pursuant to the 
ESA, the Navy prepared a biological assessment and completed a formal con-
sultation with the NMFS.31 On July 28, 2009, the NMFS issued a biological 
opinion analyzing the effects of installation and use of the USWTR on endan-
gered marine species.32 Portions of the biological opinion include summaries 
of pre-existing biological opinions regarding other naval training locations.33 
Once the Navy finalized its EIS and received the biological opinion from the 
NMFS, it issued a Record of Decision (“ROD”) authorizing construction of the 
USWTR.34 It, however, explicitly deferred issuance of a ROD for the operation 
phase of the USWTR until construction is at or near completion.35  
The biological opinion prepared by the NMFS stated that installation of 
the USWTR is not likely to adversely affect the North Atlantic right whale.36 
Operations, however, were found likely to adversely affect the whales, but the 
NMFS concluded operations are not likely to jeopardize the continued exist-
ence of the species, or to destroy or adversely modify its critical habitat.37 Be-
                                                                                                                           
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 1111. 
 26 Id. at 1110–11. 
 27 Id. at 1111. The Navy will not suspend training activities during calving season because, it is 
argued, doing so would not fully prepare trainees on the range. Final Brief for Appellants at 15, 21–
22, Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 733 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-15680). 
 28 See Defenders of Wildlife, 733 F.3d at 1110 (“The nodes will transmit and receive acoustic 
signals from ships and submarines operating within the range, thus allowing the position of exercise 
participants to be determined and stored electronically for real-time feedback and future evaluation.”). 
 29 Defenders of Wildlife, 733 F.3d at 1110. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 1113. 
 32 Id. at 1118. 
 33 Id. at 1119. 
 34 Id. at 1113–14. 
 35 Id. at 1116. “[A]ny ‘decision to implement training’ at the USWTR ‘will be based on the up-
dated analysis of environmental effects in a future [EIS] . . . and consultation with the [NMFS] and 
after compliance with applicable laws and executive orders . . . as they relate to the operation of the 
proposed USWTR.’” Id. 
 36 Id. at 1118. 
 37 Id. at 1113. 
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cause the biological opinion determined the operation of the USWTR is likely 
to adversely affect an endangered species, the supplemental preparation of an 
incidental take statement will be required.38 Further, if a proposed action 
threatens to adversely affect a marine mammal, the take must be authorized 
under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (“MMPA”) before the NMFS can 
issue the incidental take statement.39 MMPA authorization is only valid for five 
years, and the construction phase of the USWTR is expected to take more than 
five years.40 NMFS will not seek MMPA authorization until the construction is 
at or near completion, “[t]o avoid redundant authorizations and wasting re-
sources.”41 The Navy will commence a new EIS consultation for USWTR op-
erations with the NMFS, and it will seek a new biological opinion with an in-
cidental take statement for operations, before operations commence.42 
In Defenders of Wildlife v. United States Department of the Navy, De-
fenders of Wildlife and several other conservation organizations (the “plain-
tiffs”) brought an action against the Navy, NMFS, and several other federal 
agencies (the “defendants”) for alleged violations of NEPA, the ESA, and the 
APA in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia.43 The court 
granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.44 The plaintiffs ap-
pealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit on three of their 
original claims: (1) the Navy violated NEPA by signing a contract for construc-
tion of the USWTR prior to issuance of a ROD to operate the range; (2) the 
NMFS violated the ESA and the APA by failing to “meaningfully” analyze the 
proposed action in its biological opinion; and (3) the NMFS violated the ESA 
and APA by failing to include an incidental take statement in its biological 
opinion.45 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s holding on all 
counts, holding that the Navy and the NMFS fully complied with all statutorily 
mandated environmental review procedures.46 
                                                                                                                           
 38 Id.; see supra notes 79–86 and accompanying text (explaining when an incidental take state-
ment must be added to a biological opinion). 
 39 Defenders of Wildlife, 733 F.3d at 1113. 
 40 See id. 
 41 Id. at 1123. 
 42 See id. at 1116. (“[A]ny ‘decision to implement training’ at the USWTR ‘will be based on the 
updated analysis of environmental effects in a future [EIS] in conjunction and consultation with the 
[NMFS] and after compliance with applicable laws and executive orders including the [MMPA], the 
[ESA], the [NEPA] and the Coastal Zone Management Act.’”). 
 43 Id. at 1114. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. Appellants initially argued before the district court that the defendants violated Section 
1508.25 in addition to Section 1506.1 of the Council on Environmental Quality NEPA regulations. 
Id.; see supra notes 55–58 and accompanying text. Appellants only raise the Section 1506.1 violation 
on appeal, although Section 1508.25 is implicated in Appellants’ brief. Defenders of Wildlife, 733 
F.3d at 1114. See generally Final Brief for Appellants, supra note 27. 
 46 Defenders of Wildlife, 733 F.3d at 1108–09. 
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was enacted in 1969 to 
ensure that federal agencies would take a “hard look” at potentially harmful 
environmental effects of proposed agency projects and come to a “fully in-
formed and well-considered decision” in light of those effects.47 A critical part 
of the NEPA process is the disclosure of the “hard look” information to the 
public prior to rendering any decisions.48 NEPA regulations provide detailed 
instructions to guide agencies in achieving this requirement.49 
To comply with NEPA and its policies, a federal agency must prepare an 
environmental impact statement (“EIS”) for any proposed action “significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment.”50 As part of this environmen-
tal review, an agency must first prepare a draft EIS and publish the draft in the 
Federal Register.51 Once public comments are considered and any reasonable 
alternative sites are reviewed, the agency publishes a final EIS.52 Finally, the 
agency issues a Record of Decision (“ROD”), announcing its determination 
regarding the project.53 Once the ROD is issued, the agency is authorized to 
carry out the proposed action.54 
The Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) promulgates compliance 
regulations as authorized by NEPA.55 Pursuant to Section 1508.25 of the CEQ 
regulations, any EIS must cover the entire scope of a proposed action, consid-
ering all connected, cumulative, and similar actions in one document.56 Pursu-
ant to Section 1506.1(a) of these regulations, agency action cannot “[l]imit the 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978); 
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976); see National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 
(NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2012). 
 48 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (2013) (“NEPA procedures must insure that environmental information 
is available to public officials and citizens before decisions are made and before actions are taken.”). 
 49 Id. § 1500.1(c) (“The NEPA process is intended to help public officials make decisions that are 
based on understanding of environmental consequences, and take actions that protect, restore, and 
enhance the environment. These regulations provide the direction to achieve this purpose.”). 
 50 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c). 
 51 NEPA/EIS FACTSHEET, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC AGENCY (n.d.), available at http://
www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/permits/nepa.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/GHE6-PPRC. 
 52 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4. 
 53 NEPA/EIS FACTSHEET, supra note 51. 
 54 See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.1 (2013); see also Bd. of Miss. Levee Comm’rs v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, 674 F.3d 409, 419 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[ROD] is required to finalize an EIS under . . . 
[NEPA]”). 
 55 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (2012) (listing duties and functions of the CEQ, such as “to 
review and appraise the various programs and activities of the Federal Government in light of the 
policy set forth in [NEPA]”). 
 56 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25; see also Huntington v. Marsh, 859 F.2d 1134, 1142 (2d Cir. 1988) (“CEQ 
guidelines provide that proposals should be included in the same EIS if they are ‘connected,’ that is, if 
they are ‘closely related’ such that they are ‘interdependent parts of a larger action and dependent on a 
larger action for their justification.’”). 
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choice of reasonable alternatives” before reaching a final decision in a pub-
lished ROD.57 These regulations ensure agencies will prepare a complete envi-
ronmental analysis that results in a “hard look” at the environmental conse-
quences of all proposed actions instead of segmenting environmental reviews 
and wasting resources.58 
Courts strike down environmental reviews where they perceive a viola-
tion of the CEQ regulations.59 In Huntington v. Marsh, the Army Corps of En-
gineers (the “Corps”) prepared an EIS to lease a portion of the Long Island 
Sound for the disposal of waste.60 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
plaintiffs, reasoning that the agency improperly segregated the leasing phase 
from the dump permit phase of the project, in violation of Section 1508.25.61 
The court held the Corps’ segregation was “merely a variant of ‘segmentation’ 
which has been uniformly rejected by the courts.”62 The court required the 
agency to consider the cumulative impacts of the entire project, rather than its 
discrete stages, in order to properly adhere to the NEPA mandate.63 
In Thomas v. Peterson, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
found the U.S. Forest Service violated NEPA because the environmental re-
view of its proposed action to build timber-harvest roads in the Nezperce Na-
tional Forest failed to analyze the cumulative impacts of the entire proposed 
action.64 The Forest Service had prepared an environmental assessment for the 
construction of the road, and deferred environmental review of timber sales for 
a future date.65 By the time of trial, individual environmental assessments had 
been prepared for three timber sales—each resulting in a finding of no signifi-
cant impact, and thus requiring no EIS.66 
Section 1508.25 requires “connected actions” to be considered together 
during a NEPA environmental impact analysis.67 The court in Thomas found 
                                                                                                                           
 57 40 C.F.R. § 1506.1(a). 
 58 See Huntington, 859 F.2d at 1142–43 (“[Courts] do not take issue with particular conclusions 
reached by an agency after it has taken a ‘hard look’ at environmental factors involved.”); 40 C.F.R. 
§§ 1506.1(a), 1508.25 (2013). 
 59 See, e.g., Huntington, 859 F.2d at 1142–43 (holding a federal agency in violation of NEPA 
regulations for segmenting review of a dump site designation and a dump permit); Thomas v. Peter-
son, 753 F.2d 754, 758–59 (9th Cir. 1985) (striking down separate environmental reviews of timber 
road construction and timber sales because they are “connected” and “cumulative” actions that must 
be considered together, pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25). 
 60 859 F.2d at 1135–36. 
 61 Id. at 1142–43. 
 62 Id. The court further held, “‘[s]egmentation’ or ‘piecemealing’ occurs when an action is divid-
ed into component parts, each involving action with less significant environmental effects.” Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 753 F.2d at 761. 
 65 Id. at 757. 
 66 Id. 
 67 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1) (2013). 
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the building of the road and the sale of timber constituted “connected actions” 
because “timber sales cannot proceed without the road, and the road would not 
be built but for the contemplated timber sales.”68 The court reasoned that the 
“[l]ack of overall effort to document cumulative impacts could be having pre-
sent and future detrimental effects” on the environment.69 The Forest Service 
was thus found to be in violation of the NEPA rules against segmenting envi-
ronmental review of the proposed action.70 
While NEPA balances the nation’s interest in the environment with the 
country’s economic needs, the Endangered Species Act (ESA) was enacted to 
“halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.”71 
Whereas NEPA is only procedural, the ESA is both substantive and procedural.72 
Section 7 of the ESA instructs federal agencies to “insure that any action author-
ized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the 
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in 
the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species.”73 Section 9 of 
the ESA prohibits the taking of an endangered or threatened species.74 
Pursuant to Section 7, a federal agency must prepare a biological assess-
ment to determine whether it is necessary to initiate formal consultation with a 
reviewing agency.75 The biological assessment discusses the potential effects 
of the agency action on a species and its habitat, and concludes whether or not 
the species, the habitat, or both, “are likely to be adversely affected by the ac-
tion.”76 If this is not likely, no consultation is needed.77 If adverse effects are 
likely, a formal consultation is required and the reviewing agency must use 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Thomas, 753 F.2d at 758. 
 69 See id. at 756, 759 (holding segmentation of environmental review of timber road construction 
and sales could have “detrimental effects” on the endangered Rocky Mountain Gray Wolf population). 
 70 Id. at 761. 
 71 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978). 
 72 Wilderness Watch v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085, 1094 (11th Cir. 2004) (“NEPA imposes proce-
dural requirements rather than substantive results.”); Thomas, 753 F.2d at 763 (“The ESA contains 
both substantive and procedural provisions. Substantively, the Act prohibits the taking or importation 
of endangered species . . . , and requires federal agencies to ensure that their actions are not ‘likely to 
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species.’”). 
 73 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012). 
 74 Id. § 1538(a)(1)(C). A “take” is broadly defined as: “[T]o harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, 
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.” Id. § 1532(19). 
 75 See id. § 1536. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service 
oversee the enforcement of the ESA; the NMFS is charged with enforcement regarding marine mam-
mals, such as the North Atlantic right whale. See FISHERIES SERV., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC 
ADMIN., THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT - PROTECTING MARINE RESOURCES (n.d.), available at 
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/esa_factsheet.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6V3X-GLD7. 
 76 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(a) (2013). 
 77 Id. § 402.14(b)(1). 
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“the best scientific and commercial data available” to provide the agency with 
guidance in the form of a biological opinion.78 
If, after consultation, the reviewing agency determines the action is likely 
to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species, it must suggest  
“reasonable and prudent alternatives which . . . can be taken by the Federal 
agency or applicant in implementing the agency action.”79 A biological opinion 
violates the ESA if it authorizes an initial stage of a project that would “make 
any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources with respect to the 
agency action which has the effect of foreclosing the formulation or implemen-
tation of any reasonable and prudent alternative measures.”80 Thus, a biologi-
cal opinion that fails to analyze the entire scope of a project will not satisfy the 
ESA, because allowing such a segmented review would permit a multi-phase 
project to harm the environment without cognizing of how that harm will add 
up within the project as a whole.81 
In 1982, Section 7 was amended to allow for an exception to the prohibi-
tion against a “take” in Section 9.82 When an action will not jeopardize a spe-
cies, but “will result in taking of some species incidental to that action” the 
federal agency may avoid ESA liability by complying with additional require-
ments.83 The reviewing agency must prepare an incidental take statement 
(“ITS”) as part of its biological opinion to instruct the federal agency on how 
to comply with the ESA.84 If the proposed action is likely to result in a taking 
of a marine mammal protected under the ESA, the National Marine Fisheries 
Services (“NMFS”) may not prepare an ITS until the take has first been au-
thorized under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (“MMPA”).85 For a take to 
be authorized under the MMPA, it must be “incidental, but not intentional,” it 
must constitute “small numbers” of marine mammals, and it must be perpetrat-
ed by persons “engage[d] in a specified activity” during periods of “not more 
than five consecutive years.”86 
In Conner v. Burford, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held 
that the reviewing agency violated the ESA by failing to analyze the entire 
scope of the agency action in its biological opinion, because “[t]o hold other-
                                                                                                                           
 78 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(8). 
 79 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (2012). 
 80 Id. § 1536(d). 
 81 See Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1454 (9th Cir. 1988); Greenpeace v. Nat’l Marine Fish-
eries Serv., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1150 (D. Wa. 2000). 
 82 Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, §§ 4(a), 8(b), 96 Stat. 
1417, 1426 (1982) (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(C) (2012)). 
 83 H.R. REP. NO. 97–567, at 26 (1982). 
 84 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(C); see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(i) (2013) (requiring ITSs to include 
discussion of impact on species, reasonable and prudent measures necessary to mitigate impact, terms 
and conditions for compliance, and species disposal procedures). 
 85 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4)(C) (2012). 
 86 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(5)(A). Once achieved, MMPA authorization is valid for five years. Id. 
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wise would eviscerate Congress’ intent to ‘give the benefit of the doubt to the 
species.’”87 At issue in Conner was the U.S. Forest Service’s formal consulta-
tion with the Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) regarding proposed oil and 
gas permit leasing in the Flathead and Gallatin National Forests in Montana.88 
The FWS prepared a biological opinion—reviewing the leasing phase of the 
proposed action—without discussion of the potential effects of future lessee 
activity.89 The Ninth Circuit held the biological opinion must be coextensive in 
scope to comply with the ESA, and therefore, it was improper to exclude post-
leasing activity.90 
In Greenpeace v. National Marine Fisheries Services, the U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Washington similarly found that “[a] biologi-
cal opinion which is not coextensive in scope with the identified agency action 
necessarily fails to consider important aspects of the problem and is, therefore, 
arbitrary and capricious.”91 In Greenpeace, the North Pacific Fishery Man-
agement Council (the “Council”) prepared several proposed Fishery Manage-
ment Plans (“FMPs”) for groundfish fisheries in the North Pacific Ocean.92 
The Council then sought to comply with the ESA by initiating a formal consul-
tation with NMFS.93 Each biological opinion considered the impacts of a sin-
gle FMP on the endangered Stellar sea lion.94 The district court held that 
NMFS violated the ESA because the biological opinion failed to consider the 
cumulative impact of all related FMPs on the endangered sea lion.95 
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) authorizes judicial review of fi-
nal agency actions, such as the issuance of a ROD pursuant to NEPA or the 
preparation of a biological opinion mandated by the ESA.96 The standard of 
review under the APA is whether the federal agency’s action is “arbitrary, ca-
pricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”97 A 
reviewing court will find an agency action arbitrary and capricious when an 
agency, in rendering its decision, considers “factors which Congress has not 
intended to consider” or “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 
                                                                                                                           
 87 848 F.2d 1441, 1454 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 88 Id. at 1444. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 1457–58. 
 91 80 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1150 (D. Wa. 2000). 
 92 Id. at 1139. 
 93 Id. at 1140–41. 
 94 Id. at 1141. 
 95 Id. at 1150. 
 96 Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012); see Miccosukee Tribe of Indians 
of Fla. v. United States, 566 F.3d 1257, 1264 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 97 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
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problem.”98 Short of such a finding, a court is unlikely to disturb an agency 
action.99 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Defenders of Wildlife v. United States Department of the Navy, the U. 
S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the U.S. Navy (the “Na-
vy”) and the National Marine Fisheries Services (“NMFS”) complied with all 
applicable requirements under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 
the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA).100 The Navy and the NMFS had fully analyzed both the construction 
and operation phases of the proposed Undersea Warfare Training Range 
(“USWTR”) in the environmental impact statement (“EIS”) and the biological 
opinion, and neither NEPA, nor the ESA require every phase of environmental 
review to be coextensive in scope.101 
Specifically, the Navy did not violate Section 1506.1 of the Council on 
Environmental Quality (“CEQ”) regulations by entering into a contract for 
construction of the USWTR before issuing a Record of Decision (“ROD”) for 
its operation.102 Further, the NMFS had sufficiently analyzed the impacts from 
operation on the USWTR in its biological opinion, and therefore complied 
with the requirements of the ESA and the APA.103 Finally, the NMFS did not 
violate the ESA or the APA by failing to issue an incidental take statement 
(“ITS”) detailing the incidental take of North Atlantic right whales that is ex-
pected to occur during operation of the USWTR.104 
Although the Eleventh Circuit’s decision aligns with the black letter law 
of NEPA and the ESA, an alternative decision in Defenders of Wildlife would 
have better served the environmental protection purposes of these statutes.105 
                                                                                                                           
 98 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983). 
 99 Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 566 F.3d at 1264 (“We are not authorized to substitute our judg-
ment for the agency’s as long as its conclusions are rational.”). 
 100 See 733 F.3d 1106, 1116, 1121 (11th Cir. 2013). The court reasoned that NEPA required a 
complete EIS, but was silent regarding a Record of Decision. Id. Similarly, the ESA does not express-
ly prohibit segmentation of a biological opinion or incidental take statement. Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 1115; see 40 C.F.R. § 1506.1 (2013). 
 103 Defenders of Wildlife, 733 F.3d at 1118. 
 104 Id. at 1123–24. 
 105 See Huntington v. Marsh, 859 F.2d 1134, 1141–43 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding a violation of 
NEPA for segmenting review of the Long Island dump site designation and permitting, noting that 
only “faithful adherence to NEPA’s mandate . . . will insure ‘excellent decisions’ regarding the future 
of the Sound”); Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 761 (9th Cir. 1984) (“A central purpose of an EIS 
is to force the consideration of environmental impacts in the decisionmaking process . . . and the pur-
pose cannot be fully served if consideration of the cumulative effects of successive, interdependent 
steps is delayed until the first step has already been taken.”); see also Wilderness Watch v. Mainella, 
375 F.3d 1085, 1094 (11th Cir. 2004) (“NEPA essentially forces federal agencies to document the 
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The court could have followed the precedent of other circuits and struck down 
segmentation of environmental review as a violation of NEPA.106 In Hunting-
ton v. Marsh, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held the Army 
Corps of Engineers violated NEPA by preparing separate EISs for the lease-
phase and post-lease phase of a proposed disposal dump permit program, be-
cause such “segmentation” violated NEPA’s mandate.107 In Thomas v. Peter-
son, the Ninth Circuit found the U.S. Forest Service to be in violation of NEPA 
for segregating road construction from timber sales in its environmental review 
of a proposed timber harvest operation, holding that such a failure to analyze 
cumulative impacts of a project threatens “detrimental effects” to the environ-
ment, in violation of NEPA.108 
Unlike in Huntington and Thomas, the agencies in Defenders of Wildlife did 
not segment environmental review at the EIS phase.109 The agencies did, how-
ever, separate the installation phase from the operation phase of the USWTR 
during the ROD process.110 Although the segmentation occurred later in the pro-
cess than in either Thomas or Huntington, the procedure still arguably falls short 
of the complete environmental review mandated by NEPA.111 As such, the Elev-
enth Circuit could have also followed Ninth and Second Circuit precedent to 
find that the Navy and the NMFS violated the ESA by preparing an incomplete 
biological opinion.112 According to the Ninth Circuit, a reviewing agency may 
not prepare multiple biological opinions for a coextensive project.113 
In Defenders of Wildlife, the biological opinion analyzed both the installa-
tion and the operation of the USWTR, but failed to include an ITS.114 The 
court could have concluded that the biological opinion was incomplete and 
                                                                                                                           
potential environmental impacts of significant decisions before they are made, thereby ensuring that 
environmental issues are considered by the agency.”). 
 106 See Huntington, 859 F.2d at 1135–36; Thomas, 753 F.2d at 761. 
 107 859 F.2d at 1135–36, 1142–43. 
 108 753 F.2d at 759, 761. 
109 Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 733 F.3d 1106, 1117 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 110 Id. at 1117. 
 111 See id.; Huntington, 859 F.2d at 1135–36, 1142–43; Thomas, 753 F.2d at 759, 761. 
 112 See Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1457–58 (9th Cir. 1988); Greenpeace v. Nat’l Marine 
Fisheries Serv., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1143–44 (D. Wa. 2000). 
 113 Conner, 848 F.2d at 1457–58 (finding the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) to be in 
violation of the ESA when it prepared a biological opinion for the U.S. Forest Service that analyzed 
only the lease-phase of the Forest Service’s proposed oil and gas permit program, because such seg-
mentation would “eviscerate Congress’ intent” in enacting the ESA); Greenpeace, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 
1143–44 (finding the NMFS in violation of the ESA because the biological opinion the NMFS pre-
pared for the North Pacific Fishery Management Council failed to assess the cumulative impact of the 
multiple related groundfish fishery management plans). 
 114 733 F.3d 1106, 1121–23 (11th Cir. 2013). The Eleventh Circuit refused to adopt the rule illus-
trated in Conner and Greenpeace that biological opinions must be coextensive in scope. Id. Neverthe-
less, the court noted that such a rule would be satisfied here, despite the absence of an ITS. Id. 
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thus not coextensive, and therefore violative of the ESA as arbitrary and capri-
cious.115 
The Eleventh Circuit should have found violations of NEPA and the ESA, 
because any segmentation of environmental review, even at its final stages, 
weakens its effectiveness.116 Each step in an environmental review—initial 
review, public comment, internal investigation, formal consultation, finaliza-
tion, and publication—provides information to complete a “fully informed and 
well-considered decision.”117 Congress crafted explicit instructions for carry-
ing out these steps so that reviewing agencies may advance the statutory pur-
pose of environmental protection.118 Skipping a step reduces the amount of 
information collected and decreases the effectiveness of the environmental re-
view.119 
While the CEQ regulations are clear regarding the timing of many of 
these steps, NEPA does not explicitly require one ROD for one EIS.120 In De-
fenders of Wildlife, the Navy acknowledged that it will be “collecting data after 
the issuance of [ROD] and the contract for construction that will ‘inform the 
Navy’s . . . NEPA analysis for training on the USWTR.’”121 Such information 
would enrich the record of the environmental review on which the Navy relies 
to make its decision.122 
It was within the Eleventh Circuit’s authority to hold that the biological 
opinion was arbitrary and capricious for failure to include an ITS.123 Similar to 
the CEQ regulations, the ESA regulations do not explicitly reject the NMFS’s 
decision to defer preparation of an ITS.124 The ITS, however, is critical to 
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completing a biological opinion, which is, in turn, relied upon by the Navy to 
make important decisions.125 Even though the ESA framework is silent regard-
ing such a particular instance, it is apparent that the biological opinion regard-
ing the USWTR is incomplete.126 The Navy specifically states that it will rei-
nitiate consultation with NMFS and seek MMPA authorization and an ITS 
closer in time to operations.127 This supplemental review should be performed 
prior to authorization of the first phase of the project, prior to commitment of 
$127 million, and in a public forum.128  
In Defenders of Wildlife, although the Eleventh Circuit correctly applied 
precedent in holding that the Navy and the NMFS did not violate the black-
letter law of NEPA or the ESA,129 such segmentation of environmental review 
frustrates the purpose of the environmental statutory scheme.130 The arbitrary 
and capricious standard under the APA is “exceedingly deferential” to agency 
decision-making.131 Although such a deferential standard of review is difficult 
to overcome, the Eleventh Circuit was free to follow the trend of other circuits 
by rejecting an agency failure to complete a comprehensive environmental 
analysis as violative of the statutory requirements.132 
CONCLUSION 
The decision in Defenders of Wildlife v. United States Department of the 
Navy illustrates a textual shortcoming in the environmental statutory scheme 
comprised within the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the En-
dangered Species Act (ESA). Although the Eleventh Circuit properly applied 
the black letter law, the outcome does not further the statutory purpose of ei-
ther law. Environmental review requirements should not allow for any seg-
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mented review of discreet parts of a reviewed federal action because segmenta-
tion detracts from the environmental protection goals of the statutes. 
The textual shortcoming led to a particularly distressing result in Defend-
ers of Wildlife, in light of the particularly precarious status of the North Atlan-
tic right whale. By accepting such a compartmentalization of environmental 
review, the court risks allowing federal agencies to gradually destroy an en-
dangered species, which is surely repugnant to both the ESA and NEPA. As 
acknowledged by the Ninth Circuit in National Wildlife Federation v. National 
Marine Fisheries Service, however, “so long as each step on the path to de-
struction is sufficiently modest,” an agency can satisfy federal law at the ex-
pense of the environment. As such, the court’s decision is not inherently 
wrong. Given the high level of deference courts afford administrative agencies, 
the furthering protection of delicate endangered species is left to Congress, 
which could to clarify its intent, or to the agencies themselves, who could put 
forth a stronger and more deliberate effort to thoroughly consider the environ-
mental implications of their actions before they act. 
